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Loneliness—perceived social isolation—is defined as a discrepancy between existing
social relationships and desired quality of relationships. Whereas most research has
focused on existing relationships, we consider the standards against which people
compare them. Participants who made downward social or temporal comparisons that
depicted their contact with others as better (compared to other people’s contact or
compared to the past) reported less loneliness than participants who made upward
comparisons that depicted their contact with others as worse (Study 1–3). Extending
these causal results, in a survey of British adults, upward social comparisons predicted
current loneliness, even when controlling for loneliness at a previous point in time (Study
4). Finally, content analyses of interviews with American adults who lived alone showed
that social and temporal comparisons about contact with others were both prevalent
and linked to expressed loneliness (Study 5). These findings contribute to understanding
the social cognition of loneliness, extend the effects of comparisons about social
connection to the important public health problem of loneliness, and provide a novel
tool for acutely manipulating loneliness.
Keywords: comparisons, social comparison, loneliness, emotion, well-being, contrasts
INTRODUCTION
Loneliness, the emotional distress stemming from social connections that are perceived to be
inadequate (Cacioppo and Patrick, 2008), is generally defined in terms of a discrepancy between
perception of existing relationships and the idiosyncratic standards desired for those relationships.
Nevertheless, most research on loneliness has focused on existing relationships, and surprisingly
little attention has been given to the standards against which people compare them. The present
line of research addresses this gap by examining how differences in comparison standards
influence loneliness.
Loneliness can stem from dissatisfaction with the quantity or quality of relationships. For
instance, loneliness is referred to as “a situation experienced by the individual as one where there is
an unpleasant or inadmissible lack of (quality of) certain relationships. This includes situations in
which the number of existing relationships is smaller than is considered desirable or admissible, as
well as situations where the intimacy one wishes for has not been realized” (de Jong-Gierveld, 1987,
p. 120). Although an objectively low quantity (few hours in the week spent with others) or quality
(lack of close supportive friends) of contact with others is a risk factor for loneliness, the causal
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direction of this relation is unclear (Klinenberg, 2012), and a
large body of research has shown that objective social contact and
subjective loneliness are distinct constructs (e.g., Cutrona, 1982;
Peplau and Perlman, 1982; Russell, 1996; Pressman et al., 2005;
Dykstra and Fokkema, 2007).
Objective social contact and subjective loneliness are
imperfectly related because of differences in the way people
think about their contact with others—that is, because of
intervening social cognition (Cacioppo and Patrick, 2008). Social
cognition, therefore, is a promising route for understanding and
influencing loneliness. There are three options for people who
feel, or are at risk of feeling, lonely: increase the achieved level
(quantity or quality) of social contact, decrease the desired level
of social contact, or reduce the importance of the gap between
the two (Perlman and Peplau, 1981). The latter two options,
which are cognitive rather than behavioral strategies, appear
to be both ubiquitous and potentially effective. Older adults
indicated they would recommend to other lonely adults coping
strategies that lower expectations about, or the importance of,
social contact (Schoenmakers et al., 2012). Related research
has shown that manipulating cognition, such as the salience
of social connections, changes how people respond to social
exclusion (Twenge et al., 2007). A meta-analysis of attempts to
reduce loneliness found that the most successful interventions
tested with randomized controlled trials (RCTs) were those that
targeted maladaptive social cognition rather than actual social
contact (Masi et al., 2011). However, these interventions were
generally weeks- or months-long individual or group cognitive
behavioral therapy sessions, in which many aspects of cognition
were addressed (e.g., jealousy, communication, stress), so they do
not clearly identify effects on loneliness of adjusting the desired
level of social contact.
One influence on people’s desired levels of social contact is
likely to be the perceived contact achieved by similar others: that
is, social comparisons (Hyman, 1942; Festinger, 1954; Wills, 1981;
Suls et al., 2002; Mussweiler, 2003). People are uncertain about
their abilities and opinions, and reduce uncertainty by comparing
themselves to others; these others provide a standard against
which one’s own qualities—like intelligence or athleticism—may
be evaluated (Festinger, 1954). People can be uncertain about
loneliness too (e.g., Perlman and Peplau, 1981), so others’ quality
and quantity of social contact may provide a standard against
which one’s own social contact can be measured. Indeed, previous
work on loneliness alludes to an effect of such comparisons.
Dykstra et al. (2005) pointed to: “. . .the possible role of social
comparison processes (Festinger, 1954) in late life loneliness.
Older adults might be less lonely because they feel their social
circumstances compare favorably in terms of earlier expectations
or relative to peers” (p. 728). However, we are aware of little work
that has directly tested the role of comparisons in loneliness.
Just as people feel worse about themselves in the presence
of a highly competent other, and better about themselves in the
presence of an incompetent other (Morse and Gergen, 1970),
people should feel more lonely when comparing themselves
to an individual with a better quality or quantity of social
contact (upward comparison, Suls et al., 2002), and less lonely
when comparing to an individual whose social contact is worse
than their own (downward comparison). Indeed, Schoenmakers
et al. (2012) describe a form of coping with loneliness that
involves lowering expectations, which “. . .can be done by, for
example, not expecting one’s children to visit as often, realizing
that breaking down barriers to improve relationships is too
costly, or comparing oneself with someone who is worse off.”
(emphasis added; p. 354).
Similar others are not the only potential reference point for
a comparison standard—oneself at other points in time also
provides such a standard (Wilson and Ross, 2000). People feel
better about themselves when they believe they have improved
over time, and worse if they believe they have declined. If people
evaluate loneliness using temporal comparisons of the present
self to a past self, they should feel lonelier when comparing
the present to a past with a better quality or quantity of social
contact (upward comparison), and less lonely when comparing
to a time in the past when social contact was worse (downward
comparison). As with social comparisons, there is some evidence
that people make temporal comparisons about their contact with
others (Suls, 1986). In a longitudinal study of new students at
college, loneliness was predicted by satisfaction with one’s social
relationships, which in turn was related to comparisons with
previous relationships as well as comparisons with one’s peers
(Cutrona, 1982).
In sum, people should feel less lonely when they recognize
their achieved (present) quantity or quality of social contact
as surpassing a comparison standard, and lonelier when they
see it as falling short of a comparison standard, whether these
standards are social or temporal. Note that comparisons can
focus on how the target and the self are similar as well as
on how they differ (Mussweiler, 2003). However, because we
consider comparisons in which one party is better and one is
worse, our examination is confined to the comparisons that
identify dissimilarities, referred to as contrasts. We first tested
the effect of contrasts with three experiments in which people
were instructed to make downward or upward social or temporal
contrasts, and their feelings of loneliness were measured (Studies
1, 2, and 3). We then used a large-scale secondary survey
dataset to see how contrasts were linked to loneliness over time
(Study 4). Finally, we content-analyzed a sample of interviews
with American adults living alone, to observe whether people
spontaneously made social and temporal contrasts when they
talked about their contact with other people, and whether these
contrasts were linked to their feelings of loneliness (Study 5). We
report how we determined our sample sizes, all data exclusions
(if any), all manipulations, and all measures administered in
each of the studies.
STUDY 1
We hypothesized that people would feel less lonely when they
made downward social or temporal contrasts, and more lonely
when they made upward social or temporal contrasts. We had no
reason to expect that one type of contrast (social vs. temporal)
would be more effective, but we left this as an empirical question.
We randomly assigned participants to make downward or
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upward social or temporal contrasts—or in a control condition,
not to make any contrasts—before measuring their current
feeling of loneliness.
Loneliness is most often measured using the 20-item revised
UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell, 1996), which we administered.
However, the UCLA scale addresses feelings in general over
an extended period of time: respondents indicate “how often”
(never, rarely, sometimes, or always) they feel left out, isolated,
shy, etc. If participants average their responses over an extended
period of time, combining how they feel immediately after
the manipulation with how they remember feeling in the
recent past, then this scale provides a less-than-ideal tool for
identifying an effect of the contrasts manipulation. Moreover,
some UCLA scale items refer to commonalities with others (e.g.,
“My interests and ideas are not shared by those around me”)
which might be affected by contrasts between one’s present and an
alternative without necessarily tapping the emotional experience
of loneliness. Accordingly, we also measured loneliness by simply
asking participants how true it was that “right now, I feel lonely.”
Methods
Participants and Design
Two hundred fifty-five individuals recruited via MTurk12
completed the survey materials in return for a $0.48 payment.
We concluded data collection when reaching the pre-determined
sample size of 50 per condition, which a G∗Power analysis (Faul
et al., 2007) shows has 95% power to detect an effect size of
f = 0.275 in a 5-group ANCOVA with two covariates. Four
people were excluded from analysis for not writing as directed
in response to the manipulation, as discussed in more detail
in the Manipulation Check section below. The final sample of
251 included 127 men, 123 women, and one who identified
as “agender,” ages 18–70 (M = 37 years, SD = 12.59). The
experiment used a 2 (contrast direction: downward, upward)× 2
(contrast type: social, temporal) between-subjects design with an
additional no-contrasts control condition.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the five
experimental conditions. In the social contrast conditions, they
read instructions that elicited contrasts between their own and
others’ living situations:
First, we are interested in how your present living situation (who
you live with, where you live, how you live) compares to other
people’s living situations. In the space below, please briefly describe
two ways that your present living situation is [better/worse] than
other people’s living situations.
The text in brackets differed depending on whether
participants were assigned to make downward or upward
1Although concerns have been raised about the veracity of responses from
MTurk participants, these concerns were much less prevalent when this study was
conducted in early 2014, a time when research suggested that MTurk participants
were similar to traditional samples in their responses to a variety of well-
established research paradigms, and also similar to the general US population in
their demographic characteristics (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Goodman et al., 2013;
Paolacci and Chandler, 2014).
2www.mturk.com
contrasts. Participants in the downward contrasts condition
were asked to identify ways their own living situation was better,
and those in the upward contrasts condition were asked to
identify ways their own living situation was worse. We used
parallel instructions in the temporal contrast conditions to elicit
contrasts between present and past living situations, except that
we removed the text that appears in italics above, and instead
asked participants to describe how their present living situation:
“. . .compares to your living situations in the past.” The fifth
group of participants, assigned to a control condition, were
not asked to make any contrasts and proceeded immediately to
the measures below.
Thereafter, participants were asked: “Right now, how true
is this statement of you? ‘I feel lonely.”’ The 7-point response
scale had the options extremely untrue (1), moderately untrue
(2), somewhat untrue (3), neither true nor untrue (4), somewhat
true (5), moderately true (6), and extremely true (7). They then
completed the 20-item Revised UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell,
1996), which asks respondents to indicate “how often you feel
the way described in each of the following statements,” where
options are never (1), rarely (2), sometimes (3), and often (4).
We computed the sum of the 20 items for each participant after
reverse-coding the appropriate items (α= 0.96). Participants also
reported their gender, age, relationship status, and living situation
(live alone or live with other people), and provided any comments
they wished to, before being presented a code with which to
obtain payment via MTurk.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check
A member of the research team read all responses, and
four respondents that did not follow instructions (i.e., did
not describe elements of their present living situation) were
excluded from analysis.
Initial examination of the responses showed that in many
cases, it was not possible to distinguish between social and
temporal contrasts. For example, a participant wrote: “I have
personal space that no one else can enter.” This is clearly a
downward contrast but it’s not clear whether the contrast is
to other people who do not have personal space, or to a time
in the past when the participant did not have personal space.
Other examples where direction can be inferred but social vs.
temporal cannot are: “There is no fighting” and “I don’t get
to see my friends very often.” While reading, the researcher
also coded whether or not each respondent mentioned other
people. This coding was used in follow-up exploratory analyses
described below.
Preliminary Analyses: Demographic Characteristics
and Loneliness
Although only a minority of participants (35; 14%) lived alone,
they reported more loneliness than those who lived with others,
both in terms of current feelings (MAlone = 4.23, SD = 1.88
vs. MOthers = 2.94, SD = 1.84) and on the UCLA scale
(MAlone = 49.09, SD = 12.73 vs. MOthers = 40.69, SD = 13.47),
ts(249) > 3.44, ps ≤ 0.001. Men and women did not differ in
loneliness, ts(248) < 0.92, ps > 0.35, but age was related to
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loneliness, such that older participants reported less momentary
loneliness, r(249) = −0.12, p = 0.008, and marginally less
loneliness on the UCLA scale, r(249) = −0.12, p = 0.055.
With participants ranging in age from 18 to 70, these negative
correlations are in line with research finding that loneliness is
higher in late adolescence and young adults than in middle-
aged adults [review by Qualter et al. (2015)]. Importantly,
randomization was effective; the portion of participants living
alone vs. with others did not differ across the experimental
conditions, χ2(4) = 6.87, p = 0.14, nor did participant age differ
across condition, F(4, 246) = 1.56, p = 0.19. To increase the
power to detect an effect of the contrast manipulations over and
above the role of these other factors, we adjusted for living status
and age in subsequent analyses.
Momentary Loneliness (Single-Item Measure)
Because the design was not fully factorial (2 × 2 plus a control
condition), we began by simply assessing differences across
the five conditions, using an ANCOVA with condition as a
between-subjects factor and age and living status (alone or with
others) as covariates. When the single-item measure of current
loneliness was the dependent variable, the effect of condition
was not significant at the p < 0.05 level, F(4, 244) = 2.14,
p= 0.07. Nevertheless, given the preliminary and thus somewhat
exploratory nature of this initial study, we conducted a series
of contrasts to answer specific research questions. We calculated
adjusted marginal means for both momentary loneliness (single-
item) and UCLA loneliness by condition. These group means,
adjusted for living status and age, are depicted in Figure 1.
First, we compared downward to upward contrasts, collapsing
across the social vs. temporal conditions. As predicted, downward
vs. upward contrasts produced relatively lower vs. higher
loneliness, F(1, 194) = 4.85, p = 0.029, η2partial = 0.023. Next,
we tested whether downward contrasts reduced loneliness, and
whether upward contrasts increased loneliness, compared to the
control condition. Downward contrasts did reduce loneliness,
F(1, 151) = 7.49, p = 0.007, η2partial = 0.047, but upward
contrasts did not affect loneliness compared to the control
condition, F(1, 145) = 0.67, p > 0.25. Finally, we tested whether
social vs. temporal contrasts had different effects on loneliness.
They did not; participants who made downward contrasts were
similarly lonely if these contrasts were social or temporal, F(1,
92) = 0.795, p > 0.25, and participants who made upward
contrasts were also similarly lonely whether their contrasts were
social or temporal F(1, 98) = 0.01, p > 0.25. This was not
surprising given that our examination of participants’ written
responses to the contrast manipulations suggested that contents
of social and temporal contrasts were largely indistinguishable.
As noted in the “Manipulation Check” section above, some
participants’ contrasts referred to contact with others (e.g., I
do/do not live with a loving partner) while some did not (e.g.,
I do/do not have spare money). It is conceivable that the latter
types of issues still have downstream effects on contact—having
no spare money might prevent one from spending time with
friends or meeting new people, for instance. However, these
types of contrasts do not unambiguously alter the comparison
standard for determining a desired level of social contact,
FIGURE 1 | Adjusted marginal means for each condition for Study 1. Since
the control condition included no contrasts, we present it separately in black.
Momentary loneliness is a single item 7-point response scale and the UCLA
scale has 20 items with a 4-point response scale. These values are adjusted
for age and living status (alone, with others). Error bars are standard error and
brackets indicate significant differences at the p < 0.05 level.
and so they might have weaker or no appreciable effects on
loneliness (see Swann et al., 2007). As this was the first study and
somewhat exploratory in nature, we wondered whether (social or
temporal, downward or upward) contrasts focusing on contact
with other people have stronger effects on subsequent loneliness.
To examine this question, we divided participants in the contrast
conditions into those who had generated one or two contrasts
mentioning other people (n = 95) and those who had not
generated any contrasts mentioning other people (n = 103), and
repeated the analyses above separately for these two groups.
For participants whose contrasts mentioned other people (plus
participants in the control condition), an ANCOVA with the
five experimental conditions as a between-subjects factor and
age and living status as covariates showed a significant effect of
condition on feelings of loneliness, F(4, 141) = 2.823, p = 0.027,
and η2partial = 0.069. As in the full sample, downward vs.
upward contrasts reduced loneliness, F(1, 91)= 6.808, p= 0.011,
η2partial = 0.065, and downward contrasts reduced loneliness
compared to the control condition, F(1, 108) = 9.17, p = 0.002
η2partial = 0.078, but upward contrasts did not affect loneliness
compared to the control condition, p > 0.25.
For participants whose contrasts did not mention other
people, the ANCOVA showed no effect of condition,
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F(4, 149) = 0.64, p > 0.25, η2partial = 0.017, and so we did
not conduct any follow up contrasts. Although these results
must be interpreted with caution because participants were
not randomly assigned to make comparisons about contact
with others vs. comparisons about other aspects of the living
situation, they suggest—as one would expect—that it is contrasts
pertaining to contact with other people that appreciably affect
loneliness, at least in a sample of this size. In other words, the
effect of our contrast manipulation was only found for the 52%
of the 198 participants in the contrast conditions who mentioned
other people in their contrasts.
This finding is useful in speaking against an availability
bias or mood-based explanation for the results. Participants
who thought about how their house was comparatively bigger
or income comparatively better should have felt happier, and
had a heightened availability of mood-congruent thoughts, than
participants who thought about how their house was smaller
or income worse. However, these participants did not differ in
the loneliness they reported, speaking against such mundane
explanations for the manipulation’s effects.
UCLA Loneliness Scale
We followed the same series of steps to analyze UCLA
Loneliness Scale scores. As with the single-item measure, an
ANCOVA with the five experimental conditions as a between-
subjects factor and age and living status (alone vs. with others)
as covariates showed no significant effect of condition, F(4,
244) = 1.20, p > 0.250. The UCLA scores by condition
mirror the pattern of self-reported current feelings of loneliness
(see Figure 1), the differences were just smaller. However,
when we tested effects on UCLA scores for participants
whose contrasts mentioned other people (plus participants
in the control condition), there was a significant effect of
condition on feelings of loneliness, F(4, 141) = 3.48, p = 0.01,
η2partial = 0.084. Just as with momentary feelings of loneliness,
in this portion of the sample, downward vs. upward contrasts
produced relatively lower vs. higher loneliness, F(1, 143) = 3.17,
p = 0.002, η2partial = 0.051, and downward contrasts reduced
loneliness compared to the control condition, F(1, 108) = 4.93,
p = 0.028, η2partial = 0.044, but upward contrasts did not affect
loneliness compared to the control condition, F(1, 85) = 0.44,
p > 0.25.
These results represent initial support for the idea that
loneliness is influenced by differences in the standard to which
people compare their present achieved social contact. Identifying
how achieved contact with others was better than a comparison
target reduced loneliness compared to identifying how achieved
contact was worse than a comparison target. These results are
consistent with the idea that momentary social cognition—
for instance, the relationships and standards presently on one’s
mind—can exert powerful effects on judgment. Here these results
extended to answers on the UCLA loneliness scale, a trait
measure—suggesting that even relatively fleeting social cognition
can influence the way that people retrospect on and report their
experiences over the recent past.
Secondary to the difference between participants who made
downward vs. upward contrasts, we saw that downward
contrasts reduced loneliness compared to a no-contrasts control
condition, suggesting that such contrasts might be an effective
intervention against loneliness. Although this recommendation
is consistent with the finding that the most successful RCT-
tested interventions against loneliness target social cognition
(Masi et al., 2011), one must consider that reducing loneliness
compared to a control condition depends on the average level of
loneliness for control participants and perhaps on their existing
social cognition; we do not know what kinds of contrasts, if
any, control condition participants mentally make when they
evaluate and report on their loneliness. Since an intervention to
reduce loneliness is likely to be most effective when developed
using samples of individuals with high levels of loneliness,
in our non-clinical samples we instead focused on replicating
and understanding the relative effects of making downward vs.
upward contrasts.
STUDY 2
The aim of Study 2 was to replicate the effect on loneliness of
downward vs. upward contrasts. In order to strengthen this effect,
and in hopes of identifying it in the whole sample rather than a
subsample (based on the content of the contrasts), we explicitly
instructed all participants to make contrasts about contact with
others. As in Study 1, however, they were free to consider the
quantity or quality of contact, or both dimensions.
We further utilized a portion of the sample in Study 2
to test another question of interest: would the effects of the
manipulation be sustained over time? We did not necessarily
anticipate that they would be, since the effects of social cognition
on judgment should dissipate when the cognition changes.
However, it was conceivable that effects would linger temporarily;
we conducted seven daily follow-ups with a sub-sample of




Six hundred and thirty-one individuals in the United States
recruited via MTurk, who had not participated in Study 1,
completed the baseline survey materials in return for a $1.00
payment; a subset received an additional payment of up to $2.00
for completing follow-up surveys. We used a target sample size
of 150 per cell and omitted the no-contrast control condition.
This change meant that data would be analyzed with a 2
(contrast direction: downward, upward) × 2 (contrast type:
social, temporal) between-subjects ANOVA. With two covariates
(as in Study 1) this sample size had 98% power to detect
an effect of the size observed in Study 1 (Faul et al., 2007).
Upon content analysis, 30 (4.7%) were excluded since they
did not complete the contrasts as assigned. The final sample
included 341 men, 259 women, and one person who identified
gender as “FTM.” Respondents were ages 18–82 (M = 32 years,
SD = 9.80). Participants were randomly assigned to one cell of
the 2 (contrast direction: downward, upward)× 2 (contrast type:
social, temporal) between-subjects design (ns per cell= 147–154).
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Materials and Procedure
The initial survey was similar to the materials and procedure
of Study 1. The contrast manipulations were modified such
that participants were asked to make comparisons about contact
with other people. We provided an example of the relevant
comparison in order to make sure that the instructions were clear.
All participants first read:
First, we are interested in how your present living situation (who
you live with, where you live, how you live) compares to other
people’s living situations, specifically in terms of contact with
other people (who you interact with, how those interactions go).
Thereafter, they read text that differed by condition (the text
in italics is the portion that differed). In the downward social
contrast condition, instructions read:
For example, you might think that your living situation is better
than other people’s because you live with someone whose interests
are compatible with your own, and many people don’t. This is just
an example; you should come up with your own answers. In the
space below, please briefly describe two ways that your present
living situation, in terms of contact with other people, is better
than other people’s living situations.
In the upward social contrast condition, instructions read:
For example, you might think that your living situation is worse
than other people’s because many people live with someone whose
interests are compatible with their own, and you don’t. This is just
an example; you should come up with your own answers. In the
space below, please briefly describe two ways that your present
living situation, in terms of contact with other people, is worse
than other people’s living situations.
In the downward temporal contrast condition, instructions
read:
For example, you might think that your living situation now is
better than in the past because now you live with people whose
interests are more compatible with your own. This is just an
example; you should come up with your own answers. In the space
below, please briefly describe two ways that your present living
situation, in terms of contact with other people, is better than past
living situations.
And finally, in the upward temporal contrast conditions
instructions read:
For example, you might think that your living situation now is
worse than in the past because you used to live with people whose
interests were more compatible with your own. This is just an
example; you should come up with your own answers. In the space
below, please briefly describe two ways that your present living
situation, in terms of contact with other people, is worse than past
living situations.
After making the specified contrasts, participants completed
the single-item measure of loneliness and the UCLA Loneliness
scale. To camouflage the purpose of the study, we presented
these items intermixed with five measures unrelated to loneliness.
These measures asked participants about their liking for music,
liking for reading, how much they had slept the previous night,
how often in the past week they had eaten breakfast, and how
often they had skipped meals; the latter two were taken from Hays
et al. (1984), and shown to be unrelated to loneliness (Hays and
DiMatteo, 1987). We then measured demographic information
and gave the opportunity to comment as in Study 1.
For 7 days thereafter, we emailed a subsample of participants
(n= 256) a link to complete a short survey that allowed us to test
whether initial effects of the manipulation would be sustained.
To camouflage the purpose of the study, for the first 6 days,
participants were asked to name what they had eaten for lunch
the previous day3 and to indicate how much they currently liked
music and liked reading, as well as to answer the single-item
question about loneliness. On the seventh day, participants were
administered these items plus the UCLA Loneliness Scale and
the two meal regularity items. They were asked how much they
had enjoyed participating in the series of surveys and what they
thought the study was testing. They were then provided with




As in Study 1, a sizable minority of participants (95; 15.8%) lived
alone, and they reported more loneliness than those who lived
with others, both in terms of current feelings (MAlone = 3.65,
SD= 1.86 vs. MOthers = 2.82, SD= 1.85) and on the UCLA scale
(MAlone = 44.34, SD = 14.25 vs. MOthers = 39.72, SD = 13.23),
ts(581) > 3.07, ps < 0.01. As in Study 1, gender did not
relate to either measure of loneliness, Fs < 1, and older
participants again reported less loneliness on the UCLA scale,
r(599) = −0.09, p = 0.02. They also reported less momentary
loneliness, though the relation was only marginally significant
this time, r(599) = −0.07, p = 0.07. Just as in Study 1, therefore,
we adjusted for living status and age when testing the effects of
the contrast manipulations.4
We modified our analysis strategy from Study 1. Since there
was no control condition we used a 2 (contrast direction:
downward, upward)× 2 (contrast type: social, temporal) factorial
ANOVA to test the effects of the contrast manipulations. In
addition, we analyzed the two dependent variables (current
feelings of loneliness and UCLA scale scores) simultaneously.
The two measures of loneliness were strongly correlated,
r(599) = 0.66, p < 0.001, although not so highly as to be
collinear, satisfying the requirement for MANOVA (e.g., below
0.8; MANOVA Assumptions, 2020). A MANOVA with age
and living status (alone, with others) as covariates showed a
multivariate effect of contrast direction, F(2, 595) = 38.02,
p < 0.001, η2partial = 0.11, no multivariate effect of contrast
type, p > 0.25, and no multivariate interaction effect of contrast
direction by type, p > 0.25. Adjusted marginal means are
3Another group of participants (n = 258) were asked to generate one downward
contrast each day instead of reporting what they had eaten for lunch the previous
day. Follow-up analyses from these participants are not presented here.
4Unlike in Study 1, age and living status differed across condition. Note that power
to find small effects statistically significant was much higher given the large sample
size. Most importantly, the effects reported here are virtually unchanged if age and
living status are not included as covariates; they are included for comparability
with Study 1.
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FIGURE 2 | Adjusted marginal means for each condition for Study 2.
Momentary loneliness is a single item 7-point response scale and the UCLA
scale has 20 items with a 4-point response scale. These values are adjusted
for age and living status (alone, with others). Error bars are standard error and
brackets indicate significant differences at the p < 0.05 level.
presented in Figure 2. Whether social or temporal in nature,
downward contrasts reduced loneliness compared to upward
contrasts on the single-item measure of current feelings, F(1,
595) = 76.25, p < 0.001, η2partial = 0.11, and on the UCLA
scale, F(1, 595) = 31.60, p < 0.001, η2partial = 0.06. These effects
remained strong when omitting age and living status as covariates
(ps < 0.001).
Sustained Effects
Next, we tested whether differences in loneliness following
the manipulation were sustained, for the set of participants
who were contacted with innocuous daily follow-up surveys
(n = 256). To do so we analyzed their daily reports of loneliness
using Generalized Estimating Equations. This analysis has the
advantage of including all participants who completed at least
one follow-up survey, unlike a traditional repeated-measures
analysis where only all the participants who completed all follow-
ups would be analyzed. The predictors were baseline contrast
direction (downward, upward), baseline contrast type (social,
temporal), and day, plus all interaction effects. Again, living status
and age were included as covariates. There was a significant
effect of day, Wald χ2(1) = 21.99, p = 0.003, and a contrast
direction by day interaction effect, Wald χ2(1)= 46.21, p< 0.001.
Pairwise comparisons showed that although participants who
made downward contrasts reported less loneliness than those
who made upward contrasts immediately after the manipulation,
p < 0.001, this difference was erased by the first follow-up
survey, p> 0.25, and not detectable at subsequent follow-ups (see
Figure 3). The lack of difference between conditions on Days 1–7
indicates that the effects of the manipulation do not persist over
time, at least not to an extent observable in a sample of this size.
In Study 1, compared to the control condition, downward
contrasts reduced loneliness, but upward contrasts did not
significantly increase loneliness. One might therefore expect
that the difference between downward and upward contrasts
immediately after the manipulation (“Baseline”) is driven more
by downward than upward contrasts; that loneliness in the
upward contrasts condition is close to a theoretical control
condition level. If this were the case, then we might also
expect that loneliness on the follow-up Days 1–7 would be
close to this level. Instead, Figure 3 highlights a relatively large
reduction in loneliness in the days after making upward contrasts,
and a relatively small increase in loneliness in the days after
making downward contrasts. The picture painted by Figure 3
implies that each manipulation influenced loneliness (in opposite
direction) relative to a hypothetical control condition, although
we can only infer this given that there was no true control
condition in this study.
As in Study 1, we hesitate to draw conclusions about one or the
other condition driving the effect that we observed immediately
after the manipulation, since it is likely to depend on participants’
initial levels of loneliness. We addressed this question in Study 3.
STUDY 3
In Study 3, we used scores on the UCLA scale to divide
participants into groups of low vs. high loneliness, before asking
them to make downward or upward social contrasts about
their contact with others. This served two goals. First, with
content analysis we could test whether people who were high
in loneliness were able to make downward contrasts about
their contact with others, and whether people who were low
FIGURE 3 | Average reported momentary loneliness at baseline, and over
seven further days, following the first contrast made. Error bars are standard
error and the only significant group difference based on direction of contrast
was found at baseline.
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in loneliness were able to make upward contrasts, when asked
to do so. Our supplementary analyses in Study 1 found a
strong effect of the manipulation, on both momentary (single-
item) loneliness and the UCLA scale, among participants whose
contrasts mentioned other people. One mundane explanation for
this finding is an attrition bias: participants in the downward
contrasts condition who were extremely lonely refrained from
making contrasts about their contact with other people (and
mentioned their income or the size of their house instead)
because they were unable to make such downward contrasts.
Finding that participants who are high in loneliness can in fact
make downward contrasts about contact with others, and that
participants low in loneliness can make upward contrasts about
such contact, would speak against this explanation.
Second, we tested whether the manipulation was differentially
impactful for people who were high or low in loneliness
to start with. To identify a sufficient sample of participants
relatively high in loneliness, we used a university student sample
where loneliness was known to be rather widespread. Because
doing so limited the possible sample size, we omitted the
temporal contrasts conditions, reasoning that social contrasts
might be more relevant to these relatively young participants.
Peer comparisons are known to be ubiquitous for young adults
like these (Gibbons and Buunk, 1999).
Finally, we administered a measure of interpersonal closeness
in order to test the specificity of the manipulation and the extent
to which it might be due to demand characteristics. Manipulating
the way that participants see their own social contact as exceeding
vs. falling short of a standard for such contact should affect
loneliness (e.g., Schoenmakers et al., 2012), but not the closeness
participants feel to a specific other person. Finding that the
manipulation affects feelings of loneliness but not interpersonal
closeness would argue against demand characteristics as the
explanation for the effect of the contrasts manipulation.
Methods
Participants and Design
Two hundred forty-one undergraduate students at University of
California, San Diego participated in the experiment for partial
class credit. The sample included 44 men and 197 women,
ages 18–35 (M = 20.62, SD = 2.13). The experiment used a
2 (social contrast direction: downward, upward) × 2 (initial
loneliness: low, high) between-subjects design. As in Study 1, we
aimed for 50 participants per condition after excluding incorrect
responses. Content analysis, which we used as a manipulation
check and exclusion criteria in the first two experiments, played
an additional role here: It allowed us to test whether participants
high in loneliness were able to make downward contrasts.
Exclusions are therefore described in more detail below.
Materials and Procedure
Participants first completed a survey including basic
demographic information and the UCLA scale (Russell,
1996) as well as the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (Gosling
et al., 2003) and Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1996);
the latter are not analyzed here. Cacioppo and Patrick (2008)
(p. 271) report that high loneliness is defined as summed UCLA
scale scores of 44 or higher, so we created two groups, low
(n= 111) vs. high (n= 130), based on the cut-off score of 44.
Participants were then randomly assigned to make either two
downward or two upward social contrasts using the instructions
from Study 2. Thereafter they used a 7-point scale (1= extremely
untrue, 7= extremely true) to indicate how a series of randomly-
ordered statements applied to them. The measures included
the single-item question about momentary loneliness (“I feel
lonely”) as in Studies 1 and 2, and filler items about liking for
music and reading as in Study 2. We also added a single-item
pictorial measure of interpersonal closeness, the Inclusion of
Other in the Self scale (Aron et al., 1992). The scale depicts
two circles representing “self ” and “other” in seven degrees of
overlap (depicted in online materials), which participants were
asked to use to indicate the level of perceived closeness with their
“closest friend.”
Following these measures, we administered the Reading-
the-Mind-in-the-Eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and the
Empathy Quotient scale (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004).
These assessments addressed secondary hypotheses, and are not
analyzed here. All test materials are posted at5.
Results and Discussion
Of 241 respondents, 70 (29%) did not make both of the
contrasts they were asked to; in other words, they did not
provide two contrasts that involved mention of other people,
as instructed, and similar to our past cited studies, they were
excluded. They were roughly evenly distributed across the
downward (n = 31, 25.2%) and upward (n = 39, 33.1%)
contrast conditions, χ2(1) = 1.80, p = 0.18. A binary logistic
regression analysis indicated that participants low rather than
high in initial loneliness were marginally less likely to complete
the manipulation as instructed, b = 0.53, Wald χ2(1) = 3.45,
p = 0.063; the odds of failing to complete the two instructed
contrasts were 1.71 times higher for participants low in
loneliness. However, there was no interaction effect between
initial loneliness group and contrast condition, b = 0.28, Wald
χ2(1) = 0.95, p > 0.25, indicating that the heightened tendency
of participants low in loneliness to not make the instructed social
contrasts was equally true whether they were instructed to make
downward or upward contrasts. This finding strengthens the
conclusions drawn from the supplementary results of Study 1 by
speaking against an attrition bias driving those results.
Next, we tested the effect of the manipulation on the
172 participants who made the two contrasts as instructed,
constituting in this case a check that the experimental
manipulation was completed. As in Studies 1–2, men and women
did not differ in the dependent variable indicator of momentary
loneliness, t(170) = 0.83, p > 0.25. In this sample, a very small
number of participants (n = 6, 3%) lived alone; they did not
differ in present loneliness from those who lived with others,
t(170) = 0.16, p > 0.25. Age was also unrelated to present
loneliness in this sample, r(170) = −0.08, p > 0.25, unlike
in Studies 1–2, probably because of the small age range of
5osf.io/6csyh
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participants in Study 3. Therefore, we did not include age or living
status as covariates in the analyses below.
Momentary loneliness and interpersonal closeness were
correlated, r(170) = −0.30, p < 0.001, so we next tested whether
the effects of the manipulation would be specific to loneliness
(rather than closeness), and whether these effects would depend
on initial loneliness. To do so we conducted a repeated-measures
ANOVA with on the scores, by adding measure (momentary
loneliness or closeness) as a within-subjects predictor, along
with the between-subjects predictors of loneliness group (low
or high) and contrast condition (downward or upward). This
analysis showed a marginally significant 3-way interaction effect
of measure by contrast condition by initial loneliness, F(1,
168)= 3.57, p= 0.06, η2partial = 0.021 (see Figure 4).
To clarify this interaction we conducted between-group t-tests
based on condition, separately on groups of “low” or “high” initial
loneliness from the UCLA scale. For participants initially low
in loneliness, downward contrasts resulted in marginally lower
momentary loneliness than upward contrasts, t(81) = −1.97,
p = 0.053. For participants initially high in loneliness on
the UCLA scale, the contrasts manipulation had no effect on
momentary loneliness, p = 0.7610. The contrasts manipulation
did not appreciably affect perceived closeness to one’s closest
friend, for participants initially low in loneliness, or initially high
in loneliness, ps > 0.250. The specificity of the manipulation’s
effect—influencing loneliness but not interpersonal closeness—
speaks against demand characteristics as an explanation.
In light of the effects of downward vs. upward contrasts seen
in Studies 1 and 2, in samples where loneliness was rather low
on average, it is probably unsurprising that the manipulation
produced differences in loneliness for those students who were
not highly lonely to start with. Nevertheless, this finding has
important implications for the design of interventions against
loneliness; it suggests that modifications would have to be made
in order to utilize contrasts to decrease such feelings among
the highly lonely.
In sum, the contrasts manipulation affected participants who
were already low, but not high, in loneliness. This could,
importantly, reflect an aspect of highly lonely individuals being
somewhat resistant to such a brief contrast manipulation. It is
possible that those already high in loneliness may not be affected
by such a transitory consideration—whether they take it seriously
or not—just because they may have already resigned to the
“lonely mind” (Cacioppo and Hawkley, 2009).
High (trait) lonely participants didn’t change in their (state)
loneliness, so one interpretation would be that the effects are
driven by the upward contrasts condition (i.e., upward contrasts
increase loneliness). This interpretation would be in line with
the relatively large decrease in loneliness in the days following
an upward contrasts manipulation that we observed in Study 2
(Figure 1). We therefore wondered what happens over time if
people continue to make upward contrasts—do they experience
sustained increases in loneliness? This question was not amenable
to an experimental design since it would imply making people
lonely (and perhaps inducing the negative health consequences
of these feelings) over time. Instead, we used a panel survey.
STUDY 4
In Study 4, we analyzed data from a population-representative
sample of older adults in the United Kingdom. The measures
of contrasts available in this panel study refer to courtesy and
respect in service-based interactions (i.e., at restaurants, stores,
or hospitals). These contrasts in Study 4 are more specific—
and, one would expect, less important—than contrasts generated
by participants in Studies 2–3, so we expected their effects to
be weaker. However, the large representative sample that was
contacted repeatedly in this study not only allowed us to track
(small) predictive effects of upward contrasts on loneliness over
time, it also complemented the American MTurk workers and




The English Longitudinal Study of Aging (ELSA) includes
approximately 12,000 respondents recruited to provide a
FIGURE 4 | Momentary loneliness (single-item measure) and closeness to one’s closest friend as a function of downward vs. upward contrasts and initial loneliness
(UCLA Loneliness scale score). These are group means and the error bars are standard error. The bracket indicates a finding within the Low Lonely group of contrast
direction affecting loneliness at p = 0.05.
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representative sample of the English population aged 50 and
over. Further information about the sample and methodology
is available at6. We analyzed data from Waves 4 (2008–2009;
n = 11,050), 5 (2010–2011; n = 10,275), and 6 (2013–2014,
n= 10,601).
Materials
The complete list of measures administered per wave is available
at7. In order to test how upward contrasts relate to loneliness
over time, we identified measures of both variables, as well as
appropriate control variables, from the items administered.
Contrasts
At Wave 5 only, three items pertaining to upward social contrasts
were presented in a section with the instructions: “In your day-
to-day life, how often have any of the following things happened
to you?” The first item asked whether “You are treated with less
courtesy or respect than other people,” the second asked whether
“You receive poorer service than other people at restaurants
or stores,” and the third was “You receive poorer service or
treatment than other people from doctors or hospitals.” For all
items, the response options were almost every day (6), at least once
a week (5), a few times a month (4), a few times a year (3), less than
once a year (2), and never (1). There were 7,901 valid responses
to the three items and their internal reliability was acceptable
(α= 0.68), so we summed responses to these items as an indicator
of the frequency of upward social contrasts (ranged from three to
18, M = 4.91, SD= 2.16).
Loneliness
At Waves 4, 5, and 6, two items in the ELSA survey measured
loneliness. On the first, respondents indicated whether or not
they had felt lonely much of the time during the past week
(no = 0, yes = 1). The second item was: “How often do
you feel lonely?” with response options hardly ever or never
(1), some of the time (2), and often (3). At all three waves,
responses to the two items were strongly correlated [Wave 4
r(7346) = 0.57, p < 0.001; Wave 5 r(7988) = 0.57, p < 0.001;
Wave 6 r(7712) = 0.56, p < 0.001] and were summed to create
a single indicator of loneliness (ranged from one to four at
each Wave, MT4 = 1.48, SD = 0.83; MT5 = 1.49, SD = 0.83;
MT6 = 1.49, SD= 0.83).
Control variables
Particularly in light of the way that upward social contrasts were
measured in ELSA, it was important to establish that any link
between contrasts and loneliness was not spuriously related to
a third variable such as a negative worldview, or generalized
negative affect. As the best available items to control for such
a third variable, we used items intended to measure personality
dimensions of neuroticism and agreeableness (Saucier, 1994).
Cacioppo and Hawkley (2009) reported that the personality
dimensions predictive of loneliness included high neuroticism
and low agreeableness (see Marangoni and Ickes, 1989; Cacioppo
et al., 2006). To measure neuroticism, ELSA participants were
6http://www.elsa-project.ac.uk/
7http://www.ifs.org.uk/ELSA/documentation
asked to indicate how well “Moody” and “Nervous” described
them, and to measure agreeableness, participants were asked
to indicate how well “Sympathetic,” “Warm,” and “Helpful”
described them, using response options a lot (1), some (2), a little
(3), and not at all (4). These items were administered at Wave 5
only. We calculated the mean of the respective items to obtain
indicators of neuroticism (α = 0.47, ranged from one to four,
M = 2.96, SD = 0.69) and agreeableness (α = 0.70, ranged from
one to four, M = 1.47, SD = 0.49). The two variables were only
weakly correlated, r(8847)=−0.04, p < 0.001.
Results and Discussion
First, we tested the cross-sectional relation of contrasts to
expressions of loneliness, using the Wave 5 data. Thus, we
modeled loneliness using multiple regression with amount of
upward contrasts as a continuous predictor (Model 1). As
expected, more frequent upward contrasts predicted higher
concurrent loneliness, standardized β = 0.14, t(7797) = 12.36,
p < 0.001, adjusted R2 = 1.9%. This relationship remained
significant when controlling for neuroticism and agreeableness in
Model 2, β= 0.08, t(7722)= 7.28, p< 0.001, adjusted R2 = 7.1%.
As in previous work (Marangoni and Ickes, 1989; Cacioppo et al.,
2006), in this multivariate analysis lower neuroticism predicted
higher loneliness, β = −0.23, t(7722) = 20.31, p < 0.001,
and lower agreeableness predicted higher loneliness, β = 0.05,
t(7722) = 4.59, p < 0.001. Controlling for neuroticism and
agreeableness helps to establish that the reason this measure of
contrasts, which pertained to how one perceives treatment from
others, relates to loneliness is not spuriously due to a negative
way of seeing things. Results for both regression analyses are
presented in Table 1.
Next, we tested the relationship between contrasts and
loneliness over time. Loneliness was relatively stable over time
(Wave 4 loneliness with Wave 5 loneliness r(6902) = 0.65,
p < 0.001; Wave 5 loneliness with Wave 6 loneliness
r(7269)= 0.68, p< 0.001), and sample sizes were slightly reduced
by excluding participants who were missing responses at some
waves. Nevertheless, contrasts at Wave 5 predicted loneliness at
Wave 5 even when controlling for loneliness at Wave 4 along
with controlling for neuroticism and agreeableness in Model 3,
β = 0.03, t(6687) = 0.03, p = 0.001. Thus, in this population-
representative sample of older adults in the United Kingdom,
a small but reliable amount of the variance in loneliness was
associated with upward social contrasts.
However, controlling for loneliness at Wave 5, contrasts did
not predict loneliness at Wave 6, β = 0.014, t(7107) = 1.56,
p= 0.12.8 In line with the theorizing above and results of the daily
follow-up in Study 2, this result may speak to the importance of
8Because contrasts were measured at only one Wave, this data is not amenable
to more sophisticated investigation of causal relationships like a cross-lagged
panel analysis. We did test the relationship between contrasts and changes in
loneliness with a latent difference score model estimated in Mplus (version 7.11;
Muthén and Muthén, 2012). This method produced conclusions identical to the
regression analyses above: controlling for neuroticism and agreeableness, both of
which predicted the change from Wave 4–5 but not the change from Wave 5–6,
contrasts measured at Wave 5 predicted the change in loneliness from Wave 4–5,
standardized coefficient 0.036, p < 0.001, but not the change in loneliness from
Wave 5–6, standardized coefficient−0.018, p= 0.16.
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TABLE 1 | Regression analysis predicting loneliness at wave 5 from other wave 5 predictors.
Adjusted R2 Predictors βstandardized B SE t value P value VIF AIC
Model 1 0.019 (Intercept) 1.218 0.023 53.12 <0.001 18,935.8
Contrasts 0.139 0.053 0.004 12.36 <0.001
Model 2 0.071 (Intercept) 2.006 0.056 35.63 <0.001 18,316.9
Neuroticism −0.229 −0.274 0.013 −20.31 <0.001 1.06
Agreeableness 0.051 0.086 0.019 4.59 <0.001 1.01
Contrasts 0.082 0.031 0.004 7.28 <0.001 1.06
Model 3 0.433 (Intercept) 0.782 0.051 15.53 <0.001 12,290.1
Loneliness at Wave 4 0.619 0.611 0.009 65.13 <0.001 1.07
Neuroticism −0.102 −0.12 0.011 −10.48 <0.001 1.11
Agreeableness 0.032 0.054 0.015 3.5 <0.001 1.01
Contrasts 0.031 0.012 0.004 3.24 0.001 1.07
examining concurrent social cognition to understand loneliness.
That is, contrasts are associated with loneliness at the same point
in time, not in the future. If people make different contrasts (i.e.,
they change the way they think about their social contact), then
loneliness should change.
Study 4 is valuable in showing a relationship between
contrasts and changes in loneliness, which is not accounted
for by personality indicators of a negative outlook on life,
and which extends the earlier samples in age, culture, and
representativeness. This relationship is particularly striking in
light of the measure of contrasts, which by tapping courtesy and
respect in service interactions, refers to contrasts that are more
specific and probably less important than those identified in the
experimental manipulations. In spite of their specificity and likely
low importance, these contrasts explained variance in loneliness
concurrently as well as from the past to the present. One
limitation of the experiments (Study 1–3) that is not addressed
in the survey design of Study 4, however, is whether people
spontaneously make social and temporal contrasts when thinking
about their contact with other people. We used content analysis
in Study 5 to gain insight into this issue—how prevalent are such
contrasts in conversations about daily life, what do they look like,
and are they linked to expressions of loneliness.
STUDY 5
In the course of research about the experience of solo living,
Klinenberg (2012) interviewed middle-aged middle-class adults
and older adults who lived alone. These were long-form, semi-
structured interviews utilizing open-ended questions around the
topic of living alone. Since contrasts were not the research topic
of interest, participants were not asked whether or how they
compared their social contact to others or to the past; therefore,
we content-analyzed the interview transcripts to look for the
presence of spontaneous contrast statements. We also noted
whether or not participants, who lived alone and therefore were
likely to have objectively low social contact, described themselves
as lonely. To avoid coder bias producing a link between the
presence of contrasts and perceived loneliness in a transcript, we
used a multi-step coding method.
Participants and Design
There were 122 transcribed one-on-one interviews collected by
Klinenberg (2012); see data collection details on p. 235–237)
available for analysis. Interview subjects were adults who
lived alone in major metropolitan areas of the United States,
primarily four boroughs of New York City (Brooklyn, the Bronx,
Manhattan, and Queens). Age and gender information, where
available, is noted below.
Procedure
First, a research assistant read the 122 interviews and noted the
interviewee’s gender and age (if specified) as well as whether
or not the interviewee was asked about loneliness. Twenty-five
interviews that did not include this question were excluded
from analysis. The remaining sample of 97 included 69 women
and 28 men ages 33–97 (19 interviewees did not provide their
ages). In this sample, 48 interviewees (49%) reported being
lonely (i.e., said “yes” when asked if they were lonely), 39 (40%)
reported not being lonely (i.e., said “no”), and 10 (10%) gave
an unclear answer.
In the second step of coding, one of three research assistants
read each of the 97 interviews and extracted each statement that
they saw as pertaining to comparisons about one’s life or living
situation. They extracted 689 statements formed of one or more
contiguous sentences, of which 314 (46%) were classified as social
contrasts, 270 (39%) as temporal contrasts, and 105 (15%) as
unclear or neither of these.
In the third step, the 584 social and temporal contrast
statements from the 97 interviews were sorted in a random
order and the identity of the interviewee was concealed.
These statements were then coded by two research assistants
as downward contrasts in which the present was better
than the comparison standard, upward contrasts in which
the present was worse than the comparison standard, or
unclear/can’t tell. After the first pass coding, the research
assistants discussed approximately one-third of the cases on
which they had disagreed, before re-coding the remaining
disagreements. This method yielded high inter-coder agreement,
Cohen’s Kappa = 0.72. Of the 106 remaining disagreements,
75 (71%) were resolved by a third coder, and 31 (29%) that
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could not be resolved were discarded from analysis. This coding
procedure resulted in 553 contrast statements from interviews
with 96 participants; frequencies by direction and type, along
with examples, are summarized in Table 2.
Results and Discussion
The first thing to note is that contrast statements were common
in the interviews. Considering only those contrasts where the
direction was clear, interviewees made an average of 1.35
downward social contrasts (SD = 1.69), 0.76 upward social
contrasts (SD = 1.06), 1.07 downward temporal contrasts
(SD = 1.39), and 1.26 upward temporal contrasts (SD = 1.15).
Eighty percent of interviewees made at least one clear downward
contrast, and eighty-seven percent made at least one clear
upward contrast. In the subset of participants (n = 80) where
age could be identified, older participants were less likely to
have made a downward temporal contrast, r(78) = −0.25,
p= 0.026.
How did contrasts in the interviews relate to expressions of
loneliness? When we compared the three groups of participants,
who were lonely, not lonely, and unclear in their response, there
was no difference in the mean number of contrast statements
of the various types, Fs(2, 93) < 1.09, ps > 0.25. However, in
a binary logistic regression analysis, the presence (vs. absence)
of downward temporal and social contrasts together marginally
predicted being lonely (vs. not being lonely), χ2(2) = 5.04,
p = 0.08. The coefficients on the dummy variables representing
the presence of downward social contrasts, b = −0.72,
exp(b) = 0.49, and downward temporal contrasts, b = −0.67,
exp(b) = 0.51, indicated that the probability of being lonely was
lower for participants who made these contrasts. The presence
(vs. absence) of upward temporal and social contrasts, on the
other hand, was unrelated to loneliness (vs. not being lonely),
χ2(2)= 0.05, p > 0.25.
Why might the predictive links to expressed loneliness be
driven by the presence vs. absence of (downward) contrasts,
rather than the number of contrasts of various types? Several
factors are worth considering. Methodologically, extracting
the comparative statements from their context—which has
the benefit of preventing coder bias (i.e., coders were blind
to participants’ loneliness when coding the direction of the
contrasts)—has the side effect of leaving some statements
unclear in direction. Presence vs. absence is thus measured with
more precision than number. More interesting theoretically,
it is possible that contrast statements that are particularly
strong or meaningful to the participant—information that is
impossible to discern from an interview transcript—might
compensate for more, but weaker, contrasts of opposite direction
(Swann et al., 2007). In sum, however, this content analysis
suggests both the prevalence of spontaneous social and temporal
contrasts about contact with others, and a link between those
contrasts and loneliness.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Loneliness stems from the perception that the present living
situation has inadequate social connection (Cacioppo and
Patrick, 2008). As with many perceptions, inadequacy here is
determined by comparing the present to a criterion, such as social
connection apparently achieved by others or in one’s own past.
When the present living situation surpasses the criterion, people
should feel less lonely than when the present living situation
falls short of a criterion. In line with this speculation, the results
from five studies suggest that downward contrasts, which depict
the present quality and/or quantity of social contact as better
than a given standard, produce lower loneliness than upward
contrasts, which depict the present social contact as worse than
TABLE 2 | Contrast frequencies and examples by type and direction in Study 5.
Contrast direction
Contrast type Downward Upward Unclear
Social 130 (23.5%)
A lot of single women feel like failures or something and they
get a man and they’re just like oh good I’ve made it you know?
And they’ll marry a guy that almost, well not that they can’t
stand, but that bugs them and even that they’ve ion respect for
or whatever but they’ve already put a year or two of doling into
it and he’s basically harmless audit’s like going back into the
dating world it would be like having your teeth pulled out They
can’t deal with that... And I just see a lot of that as being sort of
false and not really my priority because of fear of not having
someone or because my ego needs it or I need die validation.
73 (13.2%)
Despite the way I live I am a very relational person and, to
me, meaning comes from relationships so when there are
not people there sometimes I think too much about. . . you
get existential problems about living alone. What is this for?
Who am I giving it to? Where is the love in my life? All these
questions come to bear on you when you live alone in a
different way. I say that to other people and they say that’s
not true, when you live with other people you get the same




And being alone, really alone is a lot easier than being that
alone that’s because of the coldness in a relationship. I would
much rather live alone then deal with something like that again.
121 (21.9%)
I liked sharing the minutia of daily life, I liked things
that—now that I live alone, so much of my daily experience
never gets reported. But living with someone else you tell
silly crazy things that don’t matter in the big scope, but they
make you feel more like a person when those little things
register, so I liked that. I liked being able to plan in person
whatever we were going to do
33(6.0%)
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a standard. These results contribute to an important gap in the
literature on loneliness, which is generally defined in terms of
a discrepancy between existing relationships and the standards
desired for those relationships. Whereas previous research has
largely focused on the existing relationships, the present studies
show that the other component of the definition also plays an
important, even causal, role.
The mixed methods of these studies contribute different
strengths. The first three, with experimental designs, show a
causal relation between contrasts and loneliness. Although this
relation may well be bidirectional—lonely people probably have
a tendency to see themselves as relatively worse off—very briefly
induced downward vs. upward contrasts produced consistent
differences in loneliness, demonstrating that in this direction
the relation can be understood as causal. The large survey
dataset analyzed in Study 4 indicated that upward social contrasts
(even in specific and minor life domains) can explain variance
in both concurrent loneliness and changes in loneliness over
time, in a population-representative sample of older adults.
And adding richness to the experimental and survey data, the
content analyses in Study 5 suggest that temporal and social
contrasts are a common ingredient in thoughts and conversations
about daily life among individuals at risk of feeling lonely
(i.e., solo dwellers).
The contributions of this research are both theoretical and
practical. On the theoretical side, we show that loneliness is
influenced by the standards against which people compare their
social connections. This finding is fully in line with work that
defines loneliness as a discrepancy between existing relationships
and the standards desired for those relationships (e.g., Cacioppo
and Patrick, 2008)— supporting it empirically complements the
bulk of research that has focused on determinants in terms
of relationships themselves rather than standards. It is also
interesting theoretically to note that when social and temporal
contrasts were both examined (Study 1, 2, and 5), they appeared
to exert similar effects. Note that there may be groups for whom
one or the other type of contrast comes more naturally or is more
powerful (see e.g., Lyubomirsky and Ross, 1997). However, in our
studies both content and effects of the two types of comparisons
were largely indistinguishable. The present research also suggests
that downward contrasts may decrease loneliness (Study 1 and 5)
and upward contrasts may increase loneliness (Study 2, 3, and 4)
compared to some reference value, but more research is needed
on this point. We suspect the answer will depend at least in part
on the level of loneliness and the style of thinking with which
participants begin.
One practical implication concerns how to study downstream
consequences of loneliness. Most investigations use correlational
methodology. When experiments are utilized, they have
relied on time- and labor-intensive methodologies like
hypnosis to induce loneliness (Cacioppo et al., 2006). Future
research can use the quick and inexpensive identification
of contrasts to induce relatively high vs. low loneliness and
study downstream consequences. Importantly, the effect of the
contrast manipulation on momentary loneliness was mainly
prevalent only when participants engaged in contrasts that
mentioned other people.
A further practical implication concerns interventions against
loneliness. Such interventions are often based on changing
existing relationships—introducing participants to new people
or helping them feel closer to those they know. Or, one might
change the relationships that are salient; for instance, reminding
people about their social connections, which enhances trust
in others, reduces aggression in response to social exclusion
(Twenge et al., 2007). The present research suggests that
targeting the standards against which these relationships are
evaluated is a fruitful avenue to explore, but more exploration
is needed. Indeed, interventions targeting social cognition
appear to be the most beneficial (Masi et al., 2011), but they
often involve weeks- or months-long sessions of cognitive
therapy. Future research might explore how to make the
effects of contrasts identified here more powerful, perhaps
by having participants make more than two contrasts, by
inducing social and temporal contrasts at the same time (see
Zell and Alicke, 2009), by building on temporal contrasts to
help participants generate counterfactual statements about what
they could have done differently and could do differently in
the future (Epstude and Roese, 2008; Smallman and Roese,
2009), or by harnessing assimilation processes as well as
contrasts. Then, incorporating contrasts into social cognition
interventions might make those interventions more expedient as
well as more effective.
The present studies focused on downward and upward
comparisons in which people identify dissimilarities between
their present living situation and a standard. One should note
that making comparisons by identifying similarities, which leads
to assimilation rather than contrast in judgment (Mussweiler,
2003; Bless and Schwarz, 2010), might produce effects opposite
to those hypothesized and identified here. For example, people
instructed to identify ways that their living situations were similar
to someone else’s living situation might feel less lonely if that
someone else had a high rather than low quality of social contact.
Assimilation processes explain why merely seeing a well-off
target (e.g., someone with extremely high-quality relationships)
does not necessarily make observers feel lonely (Bless and
Schwarz, 2010). Interventions against loneliness based on social
comparisons might therefore induce both downward contrasts
and upward assimilation.
In addition, future research might usefully extend the
examination of comparison processes. For instance, one could
examine lateral comparisons (i.e., no difference between self and
other; no change between past and present), or comparisons
to a possible future self. This latter type of comparison might
occur spontaneously if people assimilate their circumstances
to a downward social target and feel threatened that a possible
future self could end up in the same situation as the worse-
off other, or if people assimilate their circumstances to an
upward social target and feel inspired that a possible future
self could end up in the same situation as the better-off other
(e.g., Strahan and Wilson, 2006). Future studies may also add
mood measures taken (before and) after the manipulation,
in order to rule out possible more generalized mechanisms
of the manipulation’s impact on loneliness judgments.
We also note that SES/income level was not incorporated
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in these studies, but as it shapes potential valuation of life
conditions, it should be measured in future studies.
Finally, while the present paper focused on the role of
social comparisons, it is important to remember that feelings
of loneliness are determined by multiple sources. Classic
work focused on aberrant processing of social stimuli that
promote positive social interactions (Cacioppo and Hawkley,
2009). More recent theorizing highlights a possible role of
interoceptive dysregulation, in which lonely individuals lose the
ability to accurately “tune in” to one’s own internal, especially
emotional, states and properly use them in social judgments
(Arnold et al., 2019). Recent related research also highlights
the deficits in spontaneous responding of lonely individuals to
positive signals of social connection (Arnold and Winkielman,
2020). As such, future studies may explore the interaction
of higher-order social comparison processes with these more
basic mechanisms.
In sum, the primary contribution of this series of studies is the
attention to the comparison standards that people use to evaluate
their loneliness. Feelings of loneliness produce unmistakable
emotional distress, often accompanied by a host of undesirable
health consequences (Cacioppo and Patrick, 2008). As the present
research highlights, these feelings depend not only on objective
information about existing relationships, but also on the way that
people think about those relationships and the standards against
which people compare them.
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